This paper investigates empirically the influence of government ideology on social policy using German data. Examining the funding and the benefits of social security and public healthcare policy, my results suggest that policies implemented by governments dominated by left-and rightwing parties were similar over the 1951-2007 period. Leftwing governments, however, spent more in the 1970s and rightwing governments did so after German Reunification in 1990. Since policy convergence encourages new parties to enter the political arena, and party platforms on social policy matters are likely to undergo further changes in light of demographic change, the observed pattern may thus be a transitory phenomenon.
Introduction
Social policy has always been controversial. Leftist governments have raised welfare spending whereas market-oriented governments have tried to follow a policy of retrenchment.
Despite the (at least rhetorical) efforts of the political right, welfare expenditures, especially spending on public pensions and health care, have increased dramatically over the last decades in industrialized countries. One is tempted to conjecture that political parties and selfinterested incumbents have used the keen public interest in social policy to gratify their clienteles and to improve their re-election prospects by increasing welfare expenditures before elections.
This conjecture needs to be examined more rigorously. To be sure, some related empirical studies have examined social expenditures or benefit rates (e.g., Hicks and Swank 2 These studies have used panel data, which has the advantage of exploiting variation across countries and over time.
But using panel data is also problematic for two reasons. The first problem is that institutional characteristics of the social insurance system differ across countries. For example, in federal states such as Germany, both parliamentary chambers decide on social policy. When political majorities in the two chambers differ, governments are not always able to implement their preferred policies. Indicators of political constraints, which have often been employed in panel data studies, track these institutional characteristics only to a limited extent. The second problem is that panel data studies cover fairly short sample periods because the data need to be comparable across countries. Yet the availability of comparable data is limited. The OECD has, for example, compiled data on social expenditures for industrialized countries (Social Expenditure Database -SOCX). In doing so, it had to address a number of methodological, classification and data issues. Consequently, the recent SOCX covers only the period.
The advantage of a country-based study is to avoid the problems that are inherent in a panel data study. The inferences drawn from such a case study can then be transferred to other industrialized countries with similar institutions.
Germany is a particularly interesting case for two reasons. The first social insurancesystem was created in Germany in the 1880s (e.g., Cutler and Johnson 2004) and institutional characteristics have not changed significantly since the 1950s. Second, many observers believe that party and policy polarization between the dominant parties in Germany, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU), have nearly disappeared (e.g., Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2008 ). Moreover, some empirical studies show that government ideology has not played a substantial role in German economic policy (e.g., De
Haan and Zelhorst 1993 , Potrafke 2009b . Case studies show that social policies of the SPD and CDU/CSU have been similar (e.g., Alber 1989 , van Kersbergen 1995 , Schmidt 2005 . In contrast to fiscal and monetary policy, scholars have not employed econometric models to examine whether government ideology and electoral motives influenced German social security policy and healthcare policy. I acknowledge that Schmidt (1992) found that total social expenditures were significantly lower under rightwing than under leftwing German governments over the 1951-1988 period. Considering that social security and healthcare policy have become more important in the public and academic debate, the lack of scholarly analyses of ideology-induced German social security and healthcare policies is a surprising omission.
In order to assess the extent to which social policy is politically controversial, this paper investigates empirically the influence of government ideology on social policy using German data. The advantage of a country study is to hold constant a variety of institutional characteristics and to be able to investigate a fairly long time period. Country studies thus complement nicely the more often used panel studies. Examining the funding and the benefits of German social security and public healthcare policy, my results suggest the following:
1. Policies implemented by the two leading parties were similar over the period. However, leftwing governments spent more in the 1970s and rightwing governments spent more after the German Unification in 1990. This finding corresponds with case study evidence on social policies in Germany and panel data studies on ideology-induced social policies in OECD countries.
2. In the first years after the German Unification, then-chancellor Helmut Kohl prioritized sociopolitical objectives and associated transfer payments to the East Germans, whereas Christian Democratic beliefs favoring a smaller governmental role in the economy retired to the background.
3. When the leftwing SPD and the conservative CDU formed a joint coalition they lowered social expenditures because they had no political advantage from being more generous.
4. The German case appears to be a prime example of the fact that policy convergence among established leftwing and rightwing parties opens some space at the tails of the political spectrum: in 2007, for example, the socialist party "DIE LINKE" was founded to provide socialist political platforms. One of the reasons for this was that the SPD had moved to the political center.
5. Convergence in social policy appears to be a transitory phenomenon. The first clues transpired in 2010: the SPD, at this time the largest opposition party, was against an official retirement age of 67, although the SPD advocated an official retirement age of 67 when they formed a coalition with the CDU/CSU during [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Party platforms on social security and public health matters are likely to be reversed in light of demographic changes and social policy is therefore also likely to become more controversial again.
5
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on government ideology in German economic policy and derives the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents the econometric analysis: it summarizes the institutional background, the data and variables included, specifies the empirical models and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
Theoretical background and related empirical literature

Ideology-induced macroeconomic policies in Germany
The political business cycle and partisan theories seek to explain how politicians influence economic outcomes. One implication of the political business cycle models is that all politicians will implement the same expansionary economic policy before elections. In other words, political ideology retires to the background, and policies converge. Theories of political business cycles can be distinguished in models assuming adaptive (Nordhaus 1975) and rational expectations (Rogoff and Sibert 1988, Rogoff 1990 ) of economic actors. In any event, this distinction does not affect the final result of boosting the economy before elections to increase politicians' chances of reelection. The partisan approach focuses on the role of party ideology and shows the extent to which leftwing and rightwing politicians can pursue different policies that reflect the preferences of their partisan constituencies. A leftist party appeals more to the labor base and promotes expansionary policies, whereas a rightwing party appeals more to capital owners, and is therefore more concerned with reducing inflation. This pattern holds for both branches of the partisan theory -for the classical approach (Hibbs 1977) and for the rational approach (Alesina 1987) . Many empirical studies have investigated how electoral motives and government ideology influence economic outcomes (see, for example, Alesina et al. 1997 , Cusack 1997 , Schmidt 2002 , Grier 2008 , Belke et al. 2007 , Bjørnskov 2008 , Sakamoto 2008 , Bodea 2010 , Aidt et al. 2011 , Broz 2011 .
In Germany, inflation has been higher under leftwing than under rightwing governments. Unemployment, however, has either been extremely low or extremely high under rightwing governments. Belke (1996 Belke ( , 2000 examines partisan cycles in unemployment and inflation and introduces a hysteresis-augmented rational partisan theory.
As to German fiscal policy, government ideology did not influence fiscal indicators such as government debt (De Haan and Zelhorst 1993 , Berger and Woitek 1997a , Potrafke 2009b , overall government spending, and tax revenues (Koester 2009 , Potrafke 2009b , but government ideology did affect the allocation of public expenditures at the federal level (Bawn 1999 , König and Tröger 2005 , Potrafke 2009b With respect to German monetary policy, the growth of monetary aggregates appears to increase before elections and decline afterwards when the federal government had a majority in the Bundesbank council at the beginning of the pre-election period or when the political majority changed in favor of the federal government during the pre-election period (Vaubel 1997a , 1997b and Berger and Woitek 1997a , 1997b (Vaubel 1993 (Vaubel , 1997a 
2009).
5 Government ideology also influenced stock market performance in Germany: the mean and the volatility of the returns to the defense and pharmaceutical sectors increased if a rightwing government became more likely to win the upcoming federal election. By contrast, the returns to alternative energy sector stocks and the volatility of consumer sector returns increased if a leftwing government was likely to win the upcoming federal election (Bechtel and Füss 2010) . Higher small-firm stock returns and larger volatility have been linked to the probability of a rightwing government winning the election (Füss and Bechtel 2008) . 6 The results of Iversen and Soskice (2001) suggest that the support of rightwing parties and the support for social spending is negatively associated. 7 The results reported by Le Maux et al. (2011) show that a large electoral margin and a low fragmentation of leftwing majorities had a positive influence on per capita social expenditures in French departments.
Formal models that explain the interaction of government ideology or electoral motives and social security and healthcare policy apparently do not appear to exist. Many scholars, however, illustrate the role of government in social security and healthcare politics.
The model of De Donder and Hindriks (2007) portrays the interaction of a leftist and a rightwing party in designing a social insurance system and predicts that the leftwing party proposes more social insurance than the rightwing party. The rightwing party attracts the richer voters, and voters with lower health risks, and the leftwing party attracts the poorer voters, and voters with higher health risks.
The partisan approach initially implies that leftwing governments will increase social security coverage. Rightwing governments, however, are also likely to put emphasis on social security because an important part of conservative parties' constituencies are pensioners (e.g., In contrast, government ideology is likely to affect the funding of social security insurance.
For example, rightwing governments will favor low ancillary labor costs and will therefore try to keep individual contributions to the social insurance program low, but favor financing larger public pension benefits via tax-financed subsidies.
In line with the partisan approach, leftist governments are expected to expand the role of government in healthcare policy. Immergut (1992: 1) describes how politicians implement different healthcare policies and comes to the following conclusion: "National health insurance symbolizes the great divide between liberalism and socialism, between the free market and the planned economy….Political parties look to national health insurance programs as a vivid expression of their distinctive ideological profiles and as an effective means of getting votes…National health insurance, in sum, is a highly politicized issue." Institutional constraints, such as interest-group influence, constitutional checks and balances and divided government, are likely to counteract ideology-induced and electionmotivated effects on social policy. 8 For this reason, partisan politicians will implement their preferred policies incrementally, step-by-step over the legislative period. It is not likely that a newly elected government can pursue its most preferred policies from the beginning of the legislative period. This suggests investigating the influence of government ideology and electoral motives on the changes on social policy. The hypotheses to be tested are the following:
1. The growth rate of revenues from contributions to social security insurance is faster under leftwing than rightwing governments.
2. The growth rate of revenues from tax-financed subsidies to social security insurance is lower under leftwing than rightwing governments.
3. The growth rate of pension benefits is not influenced by government ideology.
4. The growth rate of healthcare benefits is faster under leftwing than rightwing governments.
5. In election years, self-interested politicians raise the growth rate of tax-financed subsidies to the social security insurance, public pension benefits, and public healthcare benefits, and decrease the growth rate of individual contributions to social security.
Empirical political economic analysis of German social policy
Institutional background
Germany is a federal state. In principle, Germany's constitution (Art. 30 and Art. 70 I) states that as many responsibilities as possible should reside in the states (German Laender). De facto, however, the federal government has had by far the greatest authority (e.g., Blankart
2008: Chapter 28, Blankart 2007: Chapter 7). The federal level clearly dominates the important policy fields of social welfare and social insurance (Seitz 2008 ).
The German states may influence federal policies by acting through the second parliamentary chamber (Bundesrat). Federal amendments require confirmation by the second chamber when they also concern matters of the states (Art. 84 Abs. 1 GG). In social policy, this aspect relates to healthcare matters more than to social security matters. The reason is that federal governments may modify legislative proposals affecting social security such that they do not require amendments by the second chamber (for example, in 2001, the "Altersvermögensergänzungsgesetz" did not require a vote by the second chamber, whereas the "Altersvermögensgesetz" did). In contrast, administrative procedures and adjustments of government agencies concerning healthcare policy issues mostly concern matters of the states (e.g., hospital arrangements). De facto, all decisive health amendments required confirmation by the second chamber until the reform of fiscal federalism in 2006. For this reason, divided government and checks and balances that may lead to policy convergence (Alesina and Rosenthal 1996) concern health care more than social security.
The German public pension system is a Bismarckian: pension benefits and individual contributions are closely related. Intragenerational redistribution hardly occurs in the German public pension system. Revenues from contributions, however, did not cover all pension benefits during the last decades, and tax-financed subsidies to the German public pension system have increased to cover the expenses. The German pension insurance is compulsory for blue collar and white collar workers alike. In 2007, the German Pension Insurance had
million insureds (out of about 82 million German inhabitants).
Public health insurance is compulsory in Germany. The German government regulates preferred-risk premiums and prohibits insurers from charging risk-based premiums. Insurers note that I employ expenditures on pension benefits only, not the total expenditures of the fund, which also include, e.g., administrative costs. This is why the sum of revenues from contributions and revenues from tax-financed subsidies exceeds pension benefits. Figure 2 9 In 2007, the so called "health fund" and also tax financed subsidies to the fund were introduced.
shows that public healthcare benefits (per member of the public health insurance system, in Unit root tests show that the time series described in Figures 1 and 2 are nonstationary in levels but stationary in growth rates. 10 I employ the growth rates of social security and public healthcare benefit indicators in my econometric models to avoid spurious regression.
The German political party landscape
Two major political parties have dominated the political spectrum in Germany: the leftist Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In Bavaria, Germany's largest federal state by area, the conservatives are not represented by the CDU but by their sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). No party competition emerges between the CDU and the CSU and they form a single faction in the federal parliament (Bundestag). This is why I label both as CDU in the empirical analysis. All federal chancellors were members of one of these two major blocs, SPD and CDU. Therefore, one can test for ideology-induced effects on this left-right dimension.
The much smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Green party (GREEN) have played an important role as coalition partners. While the SPD has formed coalitions with all three other parties, the CDU never formed a coalition with the Greens at the federal level. I will also consider the influence of the different coalition types, because the left-right dimension may neglect ideological differences between government parties within a "camp"
(for the Left between SPD/FDP and SPD/GREEN coalitions).
10 I have employed unit root tests to address the structural break because of the German Unification (Perron 1989 , 1990 , Saikkonen and Lütkepohl 2002 , Lanne et al. 2002 . I have included a shift dummy in the test regressions with levels and an impulse dummy in the test regressions with growth rates (see also Potrafke 2009b). All results are available on request.
The econometric models
The basic empirical social security models have the following form:
∆ln 'Social security indicator' jt = α Election t + Σ k β k 'Ideology' kt + Σ l γ l ∆ln X lt + δ Linear time trend + ε German Unification Dummy t + λ + u jt with j = 1,…, 3; k = 1,…,3 11 ; l=1,…,3
where the dependent variable ∆ln 'Social security indicator' jt denotes the growth rate of social security indicator j (as a share of GDP): contributions to the German Pension Insurance fund, revenues from tax-financed subsidies to the same program, expenditures of the German Pension Insurance fund on pension benefits. Election t describes an election-year variable. Σ k β k 'Ideology' ikt describes the ideological orientation of the respective government. Below, I
describe the election and ideology variables and their coding in detail. Σ l β l ∆ln X ilt contains three exogenous control variables (as well as a constant). I follow the related literature by including the growth in the unemployment rate (∆ln 'Unemployment' t ), the growth rate of real compensation per employee (∆ln 'Compensation of Employees' t ) and the growth rate of the dependency ratio (∆ln 'Dependency ratio' t ). Thus, conditions in the labor market, the earnings of employees and demographic change are taken into account. I include a linear time trend to address Wagner's Law predicting that the development of an industrialized economy will be accompanied by a rise in the share of public expenditure in GDP. 'German Unification Dummy t ' is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 in the year 1991 and is 0 otherwise. This coding implies that a level shift occurred in 1991. 12 λ is a constant, u jt is an error term. It is important to note that the level of the dependent variable is expressed in GDP shares, so that deflating is not an issue. To preempt any concerns that inferences regarding the political variables are driven by including/excluding the control variables, I will also present results where only political variables are entered.
The basic empirical healthcare benefit model has the following form:
∆ln 'Healthcare benefits' t = α Election t + Σ k β k 'Ideology' kt + γ Divided government dummy t + Σ l δ l ∆ln X lt + ε German Unification Dummy t + λ + u t with k = 1,…,3 13 ; l=1,…,4
where the dependent variable ∆ln 'Healthcare benefits' t denotes the growth rate of healthcare 'Dependency ratio' t ), the growth in the mortality rate (∆ln 'Mortality rate' t ) and the growth rate of a linear time trend (∆ln 'Linear time trend' t ). The linear time trend approximates technological progress (Breyer and Ulrich 2000) . The linear time trend (in levels) is expected to influence the level of healthcare benefits. This is why I regress the growth rate of healthcare benefits on the growth rate of the linear time trend. 15 The 'German Reunification' dummy is coded in the same way as above. λ is a constant, u t is an error term.
The variable Election t takes the value 1 in election years and is 0 in non-election years.
I discuss alternative codings in the robustness checks reported below.
The differences between leftist and rightwing governments will be tested on the leftright scale using the variable "Left" as well as different coalition type dummies, respectively.
The dummy variable "Left" takes on the value 1 in periods when a SPD chancellor was in office (excluding grand coalitions) and 0 otherwise. 16 In the alternative specification, the coalition type dummy variables take on the value 1 when a given coalition type was in power and 0 otherwise. I distinguish between four different coalition types that governed at the German federal level: CDU/FDP, CDU/SPD, SPD/FDP, and SPD/GR. 17 To avoid pefect collinearity between the coalition type dummies, one of the coalition type dummies must function as the reference category (here CDU/SPD). The estimated effects of the other coalition type dummies must then be interpreted as deviations from the reference category. In fact, regressing the growth rate of the expenditure categories on the government ideology dummies implies that leftist and rightwing governments implement their preferred policies incrementally. Table A1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables.
15 The linear time trends have different meanings in equations (1) and (2): addressing Wagner's law in equation (1) and the technological progress in equation (2). This is why the linear time trend is included in levels in equation (1) Serial correlation in particular occurs in the equation with tax-financed subsidies to the social security system. I also discuss results with ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust standard errors. Table 1 reports the regression results for the social security policies when the ideologyinduced effects are evaluated on the left-right-scale by the variable "Left". Columns (1) to (3) do not include the control variables in order to show that including/excluding the control variables does not change the inferences regarding the political variables. The control variables in columns (4) to (6) mostly display the expected signs and indicate well-specified empirical models. For example, the compensation of employees has had a positive influence on the revenues from contributions (column 4). The coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level and indicates that revenues from contributions (as a share of GDP) increased by about 0.29% when the compensation of employees increased by 1%. The Unification Dummy is statistically significant at the 1% level in column (4) and indicates that the growth rate of revenues from contributions increased by about 2.8 percentage points in the year after the German Unification. The unemployment rate, the dependency ratio and the linear time trend do not turn out to be statistically significant in column (4). The unemployment rate has the expected positive influence on revenues from tax-financed subsidies (column 5). The coefficient of the unemployment rate is statistically significant at the 1% level and indicates that revenues from tax-financed subsidies (as a share of GDP) increased by about 0.20% when the unemployment rate increased by 1%. The dependency ratio turns out to be statistically significant at the 10% level and indicates that revenues from tax-financed subsidies (as a share of GDP) increased by about 0.89% when the dependency ratio increased by 1%. The Unification Dummy is statistically significant at the 10% level in column (5) and indicates that the growth rate of revenues from tax-financed subsidies (as a share of GDP) increased by about 10.2 percentage points in the year after the German Unification. The compensation of employees and the linear time trend do not turn out to be statistically significant at conventional levels in column (5). Pension benefits increased with the unemployment rate (column 6). The coefficient of the unemployment rate is statistically significant at the 1% level and indicates that pension benefits (as a share of GDP) increased by about 0.10% when the unemployment rate increased by 1%. This finding may well be explained by two effects.
Regression Results
First, the annual data include shifts from unemployment to early retirement in one year.
Second, in recessions, young employees became unemployed whereas older employees retired early. The other control variables do not turn out to be statistically significant in column (6).
The results in Table 1 show that leftist governments influenced neither the growth rate of revenues from contributions, nor the growth rate of revenues from tax-financed subsidies or the growth rate of pension benefits over the 1958-2007 period: the coefficient of the ideology variable in columns (1) to (6) does not turn out to be statistically significant. In a similar vein, the election year variable does not turn out to be statistically significant, indicating that politicians did not exploit social security policies to raise their chances of being returned to office. (1) and (2) refer to models when the ideology-induced effects are evaluated on the left-right scale by the variable "Left". Columns (3) and (4) refer to models when the coalition type dummies are used. 18 The control variables mostly display the expected signs and again indicate wellspecified empirical models. As expected, the GDP per member of the health insurance program turns out to be a very important variable explaining healthcare benefits: its 18 I employ OLS with robust standard errors in columns (1) and (3) and the Prais-Winsten-estimator in columns (2) and (4). coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (2) and (4). The numerical meaning in column (2) (column 4) is that healthcare benefits per member increased by about 1.1% (0.82%) when GDP per member increased by 1%. The differences in the numerical meaning may well arise from the different sample sizes (51 versus 56 observations). The mortality rate is statistically significant at the 10% level and indicates that healthcare benefits per member increased by about 0.62% when the mortality rate increased by 1%. This is a reasonable finding because treatment costs dramatically increase in the last year(s) of life. The Unification Dummy turns out to be statistically significant only in column (2). The other control variables lack statistical significance. Inferences do not change when I estimate the model with OLS and robust standard errors.
The political variables do not turn out to be statistically significant in Table 3 . It is important to note that no election-motivated effects and no ideology-induced effects measured on a left-right scale are evident. Excluding control variables that lack statistical significance, however, results in statistically significant coalition type dummies. I will discuss these effects in the following.
Robustness Checks
I checked the robustness of the results in several ways. Excluding the Divided Government Dummy which lacked statistical significance in Table 3 suggest that some of the coalition type dummies become statistically significant (Table 4 ). This change can be explained by the correlation between the divided government dummy variable and the ideology variables: non-divided government occurred only under rightwing federal governments. Three important conclusions emerge from column (4) of Table 4 . First, CDU/FDP and SPD/FDP coalitions raised somewhat the rate of growth in public healthcare benefits compared to grand coalitions. The coefficient of the CDU/FDP dummy variable is statistically significant at the 10% level and indicates that under a CDU/FDP government, the growth rate of healthcare benefits was by about 2.3 percentage points higher than under a grand coalition. The coefficient of the SPD/FDP dummy variable is statistically significant at the 10% level and indicates that under SPD/FDP governments, the growth rate of healthcare benefits was about 4.7 percentage points higher than under a grand coalition. This effect explains why no ideology-induced effects occurred on a left-right scale. Second, the ideologyinduced effect of the SPD/FDP coalition is somewhat larger than the ideology-induced effect of the CDU/FDP coalition (although both effects do not significantly differ statistically). This finding agrees with case study evidence that the German Social Democrats dramatically increased public health spending in the 1970s (see, for example, Schmidt 1992 Schmidt , 2005 Schmidt , 2010 . The results in Table 5 show that in the 1970-1990 period, the growth rate in revenues from contributions and tax-financed subsidies were faster under leftwing governments; so, too, were expansions in public healthcare benefits. The coefficients of the interaction terms are statistically significant at the 10% level in column (1), at the 1% level in column (2) and at the 5% level in columns (4) and (5). By contrast, the results in Table 6 show that in the 1991-2007 period, the growth rates of revenues from individual contributions and tax-financed subsidies, as well as of spending on participants´ healthcare benefits, were somewhat higher under rightwing governments. The coefficients of the interaction terms are statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (1) and (4) and at the 5% level in column (2). I have also calculated marginal effects at the minimum and maximum level of the interacted decadal dummy variables that support these inferences. These findings, thus, correspond to those of panel estimates both for OECD members in general and for Germany, they also explain why no ideology-induced effects on German welfare spending over the 1951-2007 period occurred.
Health care and social security appear to be political complements (Bethencourt and The Pre-Election year variable is calculated as 1-Election t in pre elections years and zero otherwise. 20 Dreher et al. (2008a) and Gemmell et al. (2008) , for example, empirically investigate the influence of globalization on budget composition.
Conclusion
In Germany, leftwing and rightwing governments pursued similar social security and public The German case appears to be a prime example of the fact that policy convergence among established leftwing and rightwing parties opens some space at the tails of the political spectrum: in 2007, for example, the socialist party "DIE LINKE" was founded to provide socialist political platforms. One of the reasons was that the SPD had moved to the political center.
The recent demographic change and rising income inequality have contributed to healthcare policy becoming a more polarizing issue. In a similar vein, young Germans eventually will be required to finance the pensions of an aging population (economic effect of aging). Pension reforms, however, require majorities in the electorate. The number of pensioners increases and pensioners are likely to vote for reforms that foster redistribution to their own generation (political effect of aging). 22 The issue of inter-and intragenerational redistribution is becoming increasingly significant in developed countries. As a consequence, 22 On the political economy of social security see, for example, Breyer (1994) and Galasso and Profeta (2002) . Over the period 1980-2002, industrialized democracies have not been dominated by distributive power of the elderly (Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009b) . In any event, information increases support for pension reform (Boeri and Tabellini 2011) .
the political parties will continue to adjust their platforms and policies: will leftwing and rightwing political parties offer different policy platforms on redistribution and deductibles in the public healthcare system and on the official retirement age? 23 The 
